Mauli Ola Network
Community-based organizations can have an impact on the health of individuals, even if they are not specifically designed around health. Funded by HMSA Foundation and Kamehamena Schools, the project aims to measure the health impact of such organizations using a unique social network and health approach customized for each organization.
We started measuring the impact of MA'O Organic Farms but our work has taken us to several other organizations around the state of Hawaii.
The following video describes some preliminary results and
mauliola.net describes the main goals of the project and some preliminary results that include the reduction of diabetes risk for 60% of MA'O interns, the increase of clustering of cardiometabolic diseases in the native Hawaiian community, and further health and socioeconomic impacts in the social network of Wai'anae residents. Some of the preliminary result of our study are being disseminated to the community via reports, press, presentation and academic papers. Stay tuned!
Some press: Civil Beat, JABSOM, Star-Advertiser, Civil beat, HMSA, HPR, IMUA (pp.9), and UH.
RECENT PAPERS
Mobile Money Networks in Ecuador
We study the recent development of a Mobile Money in Ecuador using a unique data set from all MM transactions in the country over the life of the project. We show how agents behave over time and how they react when given tax-incentives for the use of non-cash transactions. These findings offer important lessons that would be valuable to other governments and policymakers considering MM.
Profit-Sharing and Efficient Time Allocation
We study mechanisms for the division of profits in companies and joint business ventures that incentivize employees to contribute their time efficiently. The class of efficient mechanisms depends on the type of available projects in the company and their interconnectedness. Ongoing extensions test the predictions using unique data from companies.
An Experimental Study of Self-enforcing Coalitions
We test in a controlled laboratory setting a model of coalition formation in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource. We investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior that depends on their belief of whether other agents are myopic.